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THE HISTORY OF THE POLITICKS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND F

FROM

THE TIME OF THE CONFERENCE AT

TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR AG

GREAT BRITAIN,

WITH

AN APPENDIX,

CONTAINING A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS

BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE

WHICH IS

AUGUSTUS

Containing an Examination of the Conduc

relative to the late Proposal of BUONAPARTE

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

BY HERBERT MARSH,

FELLOW OF SAINT JOHN'S COLLEGE,

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THOUGH the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France, had been ſo far interrupted, that the credentials of the Britiſh Ambaſſador at Paris, which the depoſition of Louis XVI. rendered uſeleſs,

leſs, had not been renewed, (1) and even in December, 1792, when Great Britain had ſo many grounds of complaint, no Britiſh Ambaſſador was ſent to Paris, (2) yet on the other hand they were ſo far continued, that the Britiſh Government not only permitted both the French Miniſter Chauvelin, and other agents of the Executive Council, to reſide in London, but likewiſe conſented to negotiate with them. It is true, that Mr. Chauvelin had delivered no other letters of credence, than thoſe which he had received from the late King of France, (3) and there-

(1) On this ſubject ſee the ninth chapter.

(2) The reaſons why no Britiſh Ambaſſador was ſent to Paris in December, 1792, have been aſſigned in the eleventh chapter.

(3) It was not before the 17th of January, 1793, that the Britiſh Cabinet was deſired to accept of letters of credence for Mr. Chauvelin in the name of the Executive Council: and Mr. Chauvelin's negotiation with Lord Grenville began on the 27th of December 1792.

fore, according to diplomatic ſtrictneſs, he could not be conſidered as a perſon veſted with an official employment. However, ſince he ſtill retained the title of French Miniſter, ſince he received regular communications from the new, as he had done from the old Government of France, and ſince theſe communications were both accepted and anſwered by the Britiſh Miniſtry, he ſo far ſupplied the place of a regularly accredited Ambaſſador, that if the French Government had been deſirous of removing the grievances, of which the Britiſh Government complained, they might have been as eaſily removed by the agency of a perſon in the ſituation of Mr. Chauvelin, as by the agency of an Ambaſſador, who had received letters of credence in due form from the Executive Council. Further Lord Grenville aſſured Mr. Chauvelin; "*that outward forms would be* "*no hindrance to his Britannic Majeſty, when-*"*ever the queſtion related to explanations,*

"*which*

"*which might be ſatisfactory and advanta-*
"*geous to both parties :*" and Mr. Pitt himſelf declared in like manner to Mr. Chauvelin, "*that it was his deſire to avoid a war,*
"*and to receive a proof of the ſame ſentiments*
"*from the French Miniſtry.*" This was acknowledged even by Briſſot, in his report to the Convention of the 12th of January: (4) and he further admitted, not only "that
"the Britiſh Miniſtry had both given and
"courted explanations," (5) but that "they

(4) Briſſot's own words were: "Lord Grenville atteſtait à vôtre Ambaſſadeur, *que les formes n'arrêteraient jamais le Roi d'Angleterre, lorsqu'il s'agirait d'obtenir des déclarations rassurantes et profitables pour les deux partis.* Pitt de ſon côté ne témoignait au commencement de Décembre, que *le désir d'éviter la guerre, et d'en avoir le témoignage du Miniſtere Français.*" Moniteur, 15th Janv. 1793.

(5) "On provoquait et donnait des explications." Ib. It is extraordinary, that in defiance of theſe confeſſions of Briſſot, relative both to Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, a Britiſh writer could venture to repreſent Miniſters,

"had pointed out the very terms of the in-
"terpretation, which would satisfy them in
"regard to the decree of the 19th of No-
"vember." (6) Their readiness, therefore, to negotiate with the new Government of France, in order, if possible, to avert the horrors of a war, admits of no doubt: and, though they had not formally recognized the French Republic, yet the very act of entering into a negotiation with the persons, who had the direction of it, was a virtual acknowledgment, that to these persons (whether justly or unjustly is another inquiry) belonged the executive authority of France.

as "scrupulously observant of the most nevel punctilios, which could furnish the smallest pretence for repelling peace."

(6) "Le Ministere Anglais avait indiqué à un des agens de France à Londres les termes dans lesquels l'interprétation de ce décret devait être conçue pour rallurer pleinement le Cabinet de Saint-James et le Parlement." Ib. Whether the French Government *really* gave satisfactory explanations, is a question, which will be examined in the following part of this chapter.

Had

Had the Britiſh Miniſtry, as their adverſaries pretend, been reſolved at all events to engage in a war with France, with a view of overturning the new Government of that country, they would hardly have negotiated with its agents, they would hardly have given and have courted explanations, they would hardly have declared, that outward forms and diplomatic punctilios would preſent no obſtacles to their treating on ſubjects, which regarded the welfare of both parties. It is a fact likewiſe, which is known to the whole world, that Lord Grenville actually conducted a negotiation with Mr. Chauvelin, relative to the complaints which the Britiſh Government had to make on the conduct of France: but whether the grounds of complaint were removed or corroborated by this negotiation, is a queſtion on which the reader will eaſily decide, when the notes of Mr. Chauvelin, of the French

Executive Council, and of the British Secretary of State are laid before him.

Before, however, we proceed to this negotiation, which commenced on the 27th of December, 1792, it will be neceſſary to take notice of the conference, which Mr. Pitt had with Mr. Maret in the former part of this month,(7) and which is circumſtantially related by Mr. Miles,(8) who was an inti-

7. I do not know the exact day on which this conference was held: but it muſt have taken place in the firſt half of the month, becauſe Mr. Maret, though he waited for an anſwer from the French Executive Council relative to this conference, departed from London on the 18th, as appears from a letter written by Mr. Miles to Le Brun on the 19th, which begins thus: "Je vous ai déjà écrit par Monſieur Maret, qui eſt parti *hier* pour ſe rendre à Paris." Authentic Correſpondence, Appendix, p. 63. At the end of January, Mr. Maret came again to London: but the hiſtory of this ſecond journey belongs to the fifteenth chapter.

(8) Authentic Correſpondence, p. 89—95.

mate

mate friend of the latter, and acted on this occaſion as mediator between the two parties. A French agent (not Mr. Maret), with whom Mr. Miles had frequent conferences, but whoſe name he has not mentioned, had aſſured Mr. Miles, that he was empowered by the French Executive Council, to demand an audience of Mr. Pitt, and had requeſted Mr. Miles to wait on the Miniſter, and obtain his conſent. This conſent Mr. Pitt granted, without knowing even the name of the perſon with whom he was to confer: for, what was very extraordinary, the French agent inſiſted, that his name ſhould not be mentioned, "till he had poſitive aſſurance, that he would be received, and a rendezvous was given." (9). As

(9) Ib. p. 90. Mr. Pitt's condeſcenſion in granting an interview to an agent of the French Executive Council, even though this perſon inſiſted that his name ſhould not be previouſly mentioned, ſhows how ardently Mr. Pitt deſired to avoid a rupture with France.

this

this circumſtance neceſſarily excited diſtruſt, Mr. Miles, before the meeting took place again, preſſed the agent not to deceive him; he repreſented the diſagreeable conſequences which might enſue, if he were not really authorized by the French Executive Council to demand the interview to which Mr. Pitt had conſented, and, in caſe he were not already authorized, Mr. Miles propoſed to defer the conference for a few days, during which a meſſenger might go to Paris, and return with the neceſſary inſtructions. But the French agent again proteſted that he was already empowered to hold a conference with Mr. Pitt. (10) After all theſe preparations and repeated proteſtations, every one would have ſuppoſed, that this perſon would have been able on the day of meeting to produce ſuch inſtructions from the French Executive Council, as would have empowered him to treat on the differ-

(10) Ib. p. 91.

ences

ences ſubſiſting between Great Britain and France. But, ſtrange to relate, when the meeting took place, and his inſtructions were demanded, it appeared, that *he had no authority whatſoever*: and to augment, if poſſible, the inſult which he had thus offered to the Britiſh Miniſter, he had the aſſurance to preſent another, as the perſon authoriſed to treat, who had no more authority than the pretended plenipotentiary himſelf. This other perſon was the well-known Mr. Maret, who was come over to England merely in the domeſtic concerns of the Duke of Orleans, and who, as his intimate friend Mr. Miles expreſsly teſtifies, *never pretended to have had any other buſineſs.* (11) And that he had no authority whatſoever from the French Executive Council to treat on ſtate affairs, may be proved not only by the teſtimony of Mr. Miles, but by the evidence of Mr. Maret himſelf: for, on the 11th of Ja-

(11) Ib. ib.

nuary

nuary, 1793, a few weeks after his return to Paris, he wrote a letter to Mr. Miles, in which he made the following declaration. "*I had no authority to treat, I had no miſſion: "and when I declared this to Mr. Pitt and to "yourſelf, I declared the truth.*"(12)

A ſcene like that, which has been juſt deſcribed, would have been ſufficient to rouſe

(12) Mr. Maret's own words were: "Je n'avais ni "autoriſation, ni miſſion: et j'ai dit la vérité en la "déclarant à vous et à Monſieur Pitt." Authentic Correſpondence, Appendix, p. 70.—On the 18th of December, 1792, about a week after the conference had been held, Mr. Miles, in a letter to Le Brun, expreſſed his ſurprize at the unexpected iſſue of it, in the following terms: "Mr. *** m'a toujours juré qu'il "était autoriſé à voir le Miniſtre, et je vous laiſſe à "juger de ma ſurpriſe, quand j'ai vu ſortir de derriere "le rideau M. Maret, comme chargé d'une miſſion ſe-"crete, et que c'était lui, et non Mr. *** qui devait "voir Mr. Pitt. Si j'ai été étonné de tout ce qui eſt "paſſé, j'ai du l'être bien davantage, quand j'ai appris "*que M. Maret n'était pas autoriſé de traiter des affaires* "*politiques.*" Ib. p. 64.

the

the indignation of any man, who was not endowed with the greateſt moderation. The two-fold deception, which took place on this occaſion, and the falſehoods of which the French agent was not aſhamed to be guilty, ſhewed that the emiſſaries of the Executive Council thought themſelves at liberty to trifle with a Britiſh Miniſter, even at the expenſe of truth. If then, after the manifold indignities which the Britiſh Government had already received from the National Convention, this additional inſult had provoked an abſolute refuſal to liſten any longer to the repreſentations of its agents, I much queſtion whether any Briton, who has the honour of his country at heart, would venture to blame it. Yet, notwithſtanding theſe repeated affronts, Mr. Pitt, who ſacrificed reſentment to the deſire of preſerving peace, declared to Mr. Maret at this very conference, that in caſe he could obtain inſtructions, "*it would give him great pleaſure*

"to treat with him as a confidential perſon "from the French Executive Council." (13) Greater willingneſs, and in fact, when we conſider all circumſtances, greater condeſcenſion on the part of a Britiſh Miniſter was hardly poſſible: and the expreſſion, "a confidential perſon from the *French Executive Council*," is far from indicating a contempt for the new Government of France, or a reluctance to treat with the agents of a Council, "whoſe heads had not been anointed "from the holy oil cruſe before the altar of "Rheims." (14) Mr. Maret himſelf was ſo well pleaſed with his reception, and derived

(13) Mr. Miles ſays, p. 94, that he has Mr. Maret's own authority for this aſſertion.

(14) Theſe ill-timed words of a celebrated leader of Oppoſition were applied by Le Brun, in his report to the Convention of the 19th of December (Moniteur, 21ſt Dec. 1792), with great advantage to the French cauſe, which is in general under great obligations to the ſame orator.

from

from it ſuch ſanguine expectations of being enabled to act as a mediator of peace, which he ſincerely wiſhed to preſerve, (15) that he immediately diſpatched a courier to Paris, in the hope of obtaining inſtructions to treat with the Britiſh Government. (16) But the French Executive Council not only refuſed to ſend the required inſtructions, but even ordered him to abſtain from all converſation with Mr. Pitt on the ſubject of politicks, and to return immediately to Paris. "He was at my houſe," ſays Mr. Miles, (17) "when the diſpatch arrived, and I read "it with the more ſurprize and indigna- "tion on finding that Le Brun had re- "ported to the Convention, that Mr. Pitt, "*alarmed*, (18) had ſolicited an interview

(15) Authentic Correſpondence, p. 91, 92.

(16) Ib. p. 94.

(17) Ib. p. 95.

(18) As Le Brun attributed to fear Mr. Pitt's readineſs to treat with an agent of the French Executive

"with the ſecret agents of the Executive "Council, but that he (Le Brun), had ex- "preſsly forbidden them to have any com- "munication with the Engliſh Miniſter."

Council, which he moreover ſtrangely perverted, what inference would he have deduced, had a Britiſh Ambaſſador been ſent to Paris to demand explanations? Nor was Le Brun the only one, who aſcribed Mr. Pitt's pacific diſpoſition to the meaneſt motives, on which account Mr. Miles, in a letter to Le Brun of the 2d of January, 1793, made the following complaint: "Sa condéſcendance à été attribuée, non à la fran- "chiſe, non à l'intérêt qu'il eſt cenſé prendre à la proſ- "périté de ſa patrie, non pas à un principe de bonne "politique, fondé ſur les baſes de la probité et de l'hu- "manité, mais à la faibleſſe, ou à un motif encore "moins excuſable, qui ne lui ſera jamais attribué *que* "*par des hommes ſans vertu, et qui étant dépourvus de tout* "*ſentiment d'honneur, ne croyent pas que de tels ſentimens* "*puiſſent exiſter chez les autres.* Selon eux, c'était à la "crainte ou à la perfidie, que M. Maret devait ſon en- "trevue avec M. Pitt. Grand Dieu! quelle crainte "aurait-il pu avoir? Une ſeule peut-être! Le poi- "gnard d'un aſſaſſin? Et qu'avait-il à gagner par la per- "fidie, etc.?" Authentic Correſpondence. Appendix, p. 92.

Dejected

Dejected at the unexpected iſſue of this affair, Mr. Miles wrote to Le Brun on the 18th of December, the day that Mr. Maret departed from London, and ſaid, "I am ſincerely grieved to ſee all my efforts for preſerving peace and uniting the two nations, likely to fail through ill-founded prepoſſeſſions,(19) miſconceptions, and underhand manœuvres,(20) as dangerous, as they are contrary to the real intereſt of both countries."(21) In the ſame letter,

(19) Namely, ill-founded prepoſſeſſions againſt the Britiſh Miniſtry, which Mr. Miles in this letter endeavours to remove.

(20) Mr. Miles (p. 94.) aſcribes to the underhand manœuvres of Mr. Chauvelin, to whom Mr. Maret communicated the converſation between himſelf and Mr. Pitt, the refuſal of the Executive Council, to permit Mr. Maret to negotiate. At the ſame time, another motive operated probably with Le Brun, as will appear hereafter.

(21) "Londres, le 18 Decembre, 1792.
"Je ſuis au deſeſpoir, Monſieur, de voir tous mes efforts

ſpeaking of Noel and Maret, he ſaid, "I "cannot but approve of their civility to- "ward me, and their loyalty toward their "country: *and if you had permitted the lat- "ter to complete what he had ſo well begun, I "believe you would have had reaſon to be ſatis- "fied with his conduct.* After having aſſured "you, that I had no perſonal intereſt in the "negotiation, for which I had nearly paved "the way, I hope you will yield to wiſe and "prudent counſels, and that you will not "miſs the opportunity, which offers, of "ſecuring happineſs to your country, and "tranquillity to Europe. Do not imagine, "that the people of England are diſpoſed to "revolt againſt the Government: do not "imagine, that war is wiſhed for in this

"forts pour conſerver la paix et rapprocher les deux "nations prêts à s'échouer par des préventions mal- "fondées, des malentendus, et des intrigues ſourdes "et dangereuſes, autant qu'elles ſont contraires aux "véritables intérêts des deux pays." Authentic Correſpondence. Appendix, p. 471.

"country

"country: on the contrary, we wiſh to live "on good terms with France." (22) In the ſame letter, likewiſe, he declared to Le Brun, that, though Mr. Maret's conference with Mr. Pitt had, through the fault of the Executive Council, produced no effect, he had promiſed Mr. Noel, (who was then lately arrived in London, but before the end of the month went as French Miniſter to the Hague) to procure for him alſo a conference,

(22) "J'ai à me louer de leur conduite honnête à "mon égard et loyale envers leur patrie; *et ſi vous euſ-* "*ſiez permis au dernier* (Maret) *d'achever ce qu'il a ſi* "*bien commencé, je crois que vous auriez eu lieu d'en être* "*très ſatisfait.* Après vous avoir aſſuré, que je n'ai au- "cun intérêt perſonnel dans la négotiation que j'avais "preſque entamée, j'eſpère que vous vous prêterez à "des conſeils ſages et prudents, et que vous ne perdrez "pas l'occaſion qui ſe préſente d'aſſurer le bonheur de "votre pays et la tranquillité de l'Europe. N'imaginez "point que le peuple Anglais ſoit diſpoſé à ſe revolter, "contre le Gouvernement; n'imaginez pas qu'on dé- "ſire la guerre ici; point du tout, nous déſirons de "vivre en bonne intelligence avec la France." Ib. P. 77.

as ſoon as he ſhould be authorized by the Executive Council :(23) and in another letter which he wrote on the following day, and which Mr. Noel himſelf tranſmitted to Paris, (24) he again reminded Le Brun "to "authoriſe either Maret or Noel, to give ſa- "tisfactory explanations upon thoſe points, "which appeared, and with reaſon, to give "uneaſineſs to our Government."(25) But all his expoſtulations were fruitleſs : for the

(23) "La premiere fois que je vis M. Noel, et qu'il "m'eut appris l'objet de ſon voyage, je lui promis de "lui procurer le moyen d'obtenir une entrevue avec "M. Pitt, dès qu'il eut l'autoriſation du Conſeil Exé- "cutif." Ib. p. 76.

(24) His letter to Le Brun of the 19th of December begins thus. "Je vous ai déjà écrit par M. Maret, qui "eſt parti hier pour ſe rendre à Paris. Je vous écris en- "core aujourd'hui confidentiellement, et c'eſt M. Noel "qui aura la bonté de faire paſſer ma lettre." Ib. p. 63.

(25) "Voilà l'hiſtoire abrégée de cette ridicule aven- "ture (Mr. Maret's conference with Mr. Pitt) qui "m'ôtera

French Executive Council departed not from the resolution which had been once taken. (26)

It is here unnecessary to examine, whether the Executive Council acted with propriety or not, in refusing to authorise Mr. Maret to treat with the British Ministry, as it undoubtedly possessed the power of exercising its own judgment, in regard to the choice of a negotiator. But, as Mr. Maret had already had a conference with Mr. Pitt, as he was highly satisfied with his reception, and in consequence of the assurances which he received from the British Minister, had sent a courier to Paris in order to obtain in-

" m'ôtera à jamais peut-être les moyens d'entamer une " négotiation, *si vous n'autorisez pas Maret ou Noel à* " *donner des explications suffisantes sur les points qui sem-* " *blent donner, et avec raison, de l'inquiétude à notre Gou-* " *vernement.*" Ib. p. 65.

(26) This resolution has been quoted at the end of the preceding paragraph.

ſtructions, the refuſal of the Executive Council, eſpecially as Mr. Maret himſelf ſincerely wiſhed to prevent a rupture, by no means evinced a ſimilar pacific diſpoſition on the part of the French Government. Mr. Chauvelin, on the contrary, was very hoſtilely inclined: he made no ſcruple to declare, "that "if he was not received at St. James's, *the* "*height of his ambition would be to leave this* "*country with a declaration of war:*"(27) and Mr. Miles, who was well acquainted with his character, has declared, that if a pretext for a quarrel between the two countries had been purpoſely ſought, "France certainly could not have ſelected a better object for the purpoſe."(28) It is no wonder therefore that the Britiſh Miniſtry would rather have negotiated with Mr. Maret, whoſe pacific ſentiments coincided with their

(27) Authentic Correſpondence, p. 84.

(28) Ibid.

own,

own, than with Mr. Chauvelin, who was equally deſirous of war with his employers themſelves. Beſides, if Mr. Chauvelin alone was deſtined to negotiate, why did the Executive Council ſend ſo many other agents at this time to London :(29) and why did theſe agents demand conferences, if they had no authority to treat? We may ſubmit it to the judgment of every impartial man to determine, whether this conduct bore not evident marks of duplicity, whether theſe agents belonged not to the claſs of emiſſaries, whoſe object was to excite an inſurrection, and whether the conferences, demanded of the Britiſh Miniſtry, were not intended merely as cloaks to cover their really hoſtile deſigns.(30) It may be demanded further, whe-

(29) Mr. Miles (p. 96) ſays, "there was a conſtant ſupply of them." But Mr. Maret, as we have ſeen, was not of the number, as he had no miſſion whatſoever from the Executive Council.

(30) Mr. Miles (p. 94) has promiſed to explain at a

ther Le Brun, if he had been diſpoſed to prevent a rupture with Great Britain, would have ſo ſhamefully miſinterpreted the conference which was held with Mr. Maret: or whether the Executive Council would have permitted it, if they had not been inclined to provoke the Britiſh Government to a conteſt, which, it was the firm belief in Paris, would inſtantly occaſion a revolt throughout this country. (31) But whether theſe queſtions be anſwered in the affirmative or not, thus much at leaſt has been proved by evidence, which no one can controvert, that it was no refuſal on the part of the Britiſh Miniſtry, as Oppoſition writers, and Oppoſition orators have repeatedly aſſerted, but the obſtinacy of the French Exe-

future period the cauſe of the above-mentioned impoſition, which was practiſed by the French agent both on himſelf and Mr. Pitt. Whether he has ever done ſo, I know not.

(31) See the Authentic Correſpondence, p. 96.

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cutive Council, which prevented Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret from producing the defired effect.(32)

(32) Though the calumnies, which have been propagated againſt the Britiſh Government both at home and abroad during the preſent war, are almoſt without number, yet nothing can well ſurpaſs the malevolence, which appears in the inventions, which certain perſons have ventured to lay before the public as real hiſtory, in regard to Mr. Maret. For they have not only declared, that he was furniſhed with inſtructions from the Executive Council, but have even fabricated the terms of theſe inſtructions, which they have rendered very conciliatory, in order to increaſe the odium, which they would willingly throw on Miniſters, who, as they pretend, refuſed theſe advantageous offers, and conſequently, as the ſaid perſons conclude, merited the execration of their country. That this repreſentation of the conduct of certain Oppoſition writers may not be thought exaggerated, I will quote the following paſſage, which every one acquainted with political publications will eaſily know where to find. "It is confidently reported, that Mr. Maret had in his inſtructions, "unequivocally to offer to our Miniſtry theſe three "points. Firſt, that the navigation of the Scheldt ſhould "be given up; ſecondly, that the French troops ſhould not

As it was the will therefore of the French Executive Council, that Mr. Chauvelin alone ſhould conduct the negotiation with the Bri-

" not approach the Dutch territories within a given " diſtance; and that the decree of the 19th of Novem- " ber ſhould be either altered or repealed. When the " oſtenſible reaſons for undertaking a war are thus pre- " viouſly removed by the conceſſion of the enemy, then " none but the moſt ſuſpicious motives can induce Mi- " niſters to ſacrifice the peace, treaſure, and welfare of " the country to their ſecret or wicked views." A charge of ſo black a nature, as is here laid to the Britiſh Miniſtry, and laid with the conſciouſneſs, as it neceſſarily was, of being unable to ſupport it by any real evidence, betrays ſomething worſe than mere levity. Nor has the charge been confined to political publications, for it has been often heard even in the Britiſh Senate, till the authentic documents were publiſhed by Mr. Miles, who calls it (p. 92.) " the vile expedient of a diſtreſſed " and hungry faction, impatient to get into office, upon " any terms, and by any means."—Similar falſhoods were propagated in regard to Mr. Maret's journey to London at the end of January, 1793; but the notice of theſe muſt be deferred to the fifteenth chapter, where the hiſtory of Mr. Maret's ſecond journey will be given at large.

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tiſh Miniſtry, he accordingly, on the 27th of December, 1792, delivered to Lord Grenville, his Majeſty's Principal Secretary of State for the foreign department, the following note. (33)

33. The French original is printed in the Moniteur, 3d. Jan. 1793.—In order to preſerve, as much as poſſible, diplomatic accuracy, I have in general hitherto quoted French documents in their original language, even where an Engliſh tranſlation is given in the text. But as the notes, which were exchanged during the preſent negotiation are very long, and it is neceſſary to lay the *whole* of their contents before the reader, in order to enable him to judge, whether the ſubjects in debate were fully exhauſted, on which his final deciſion muſt now depend: further, as theſe notes in the Engliſh tranſlation were laid before the Britiſh Parliament on the 28th of January, 1793, and thus acquired the authority of the originals themſelves, I hope no one will take it ill, that I here make an exception, and produce only the Engliſh tranſlation, which I copy from the New Annual Regiſter. However, ſhould any one doubt of its accuracy, he may eaſily compare it with the originals, becauſe it will be always noted, where the originals are to be found: and in thoſe paſſages, where there is room for verbal criticiſm, I ſhall not neglect to quote even

"The undersigned Minister Plenipoten-
"tiary of France has the honour to com-
"municate to Lord Grenville the instructions,
"which he has received from the Executive
"Council of the French Republic, with or-
"ders to lay them before his Britannic Ma-
"jesty's Secretary of State for the depart-
"ment of foreign affairs, in case he should
"think that he should not speedily enough
"obtain an interview with the Minister.

"The French Government, by continu-
"ing, since the recall of Lord Gower from
"Paris, to leave at London a Minister Ple-

even here the French words themselves. At the same time I shall take the liberty of accompanying the notes, which passed on this occasion, with a continued commentary, in which the *actions* of the French Government will be compared with its *declarations*.—During this negotiation, Mr. Chauvelin wrote twice to Lord Grenville on the alien and corn bills: these two letters have no reference to our present inquiry, but belong to the eleventh chapter, where proper notice has been already taken of them.

"nipotentiary,

" nipotentiary, though they gave to his Bri-
" tannic Majeſty an unequivocal proof of
" the deſire they had to remain in good un-
" derſtanding with the Britiſh Court,(34)

(34) This argument has likewiſe been uſed even by Britiſh writers, to prove the pacific diſpoſition of the French rulers. But the premiſes by no means warrant the inference, which is deduced from them: for one Government may have reſolved to engage in war with another, and yet, in order to conceal its intentions, permit its Ambaſſador to reſide with that other Government, till the plan is fully ripe for execution. The mere poſſibility of this caſe deſtroys the whole force of the above-mentioned argument: and that in regard to France it was not only poſſible, but highly probable, or rather abſolutely certain, is evident from the facts, which have been related in the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work. Further, it is to be obſerved, that, immediately after the return of Lord Gower from Paris, Mr. Chauvelin was actually recalled from London, that his letters of recall were brought by Mr. Noel, that Mr. Chauvelin objected, " that though he was
" not well with the Engliſh Miniſter, yet he was per-
" fectly ſo with Mr. Fox, and ſome other members of
" Oppoſition, and that it would not be prudent in
" France *to loſe the fruits of his labours with theſe gen-*
" *tlemen,*

" and to ſee all thoſe clouds diſſipated,
" to which events, neceſſary and inſepa-
" rable from the internal Government of
" France, (35) ſeemed then to have given
" birth. The intentions of the Executive
" Council of France toward England have
" never ceaſed to be the ſame: (36) but

" *tlemen, and their ſubſequent ſervices*, for a vain form of " diplomatic etiquette," and that in conſequence of this argument the Executive Council revoked the order, and permitted Mr. Chauvelin's further reſidence in London. See the Authentic Correſpondence, Appendix, p. 83. So far therefore was *friendſhip* for the Britiſh Court, as was aſſerted in Mr. Chauvelin's note, the cauſe of his continuing to reſide in London, that ſheer *enmity* to the Court of Great Britain was the motive of it.

(35) The events, which are here officially declared to have been *neceſſary, and inſeparable from the internal Government of France*, were the maſſacres committed on the 10th of Auguſt, 1792. From this declaration we may judge of the character of the men, with whom Great Britain was then doomed to negotiate.

(36) This aſſertion admits of no doubt.

" they

"they cannot ſee with indifference the "public conduct, which the Britiſh Miniſ-"ſtry obſerve at preſent toward France. "It is much to be regretted, that they "have perceived in this conduct an in-"diſpoſition, which they ſtill force them-"ſelves not to believe.(37) They think it a "duty, however, which they owe to the "French nation, not to leave it much longer

(37) The French Executive Council here complains, that the Britiſh Government was *ill* diſpoſed toward that of France, as if they had a right to expect that it ſhould be *well* diſpoſed toward thoſe, who on the 28th of November, and on other occaſions, had avowed their intentions of overturning the Britiſh conſtitution. But it is the practice of the modern rulers of France to make an abſolute game of common ſenſe; and they ſhew in all their dealings, that they imagine men are already prepared to receive chains not only for their perſons, but for their underſtandings. It muſt be admitted, likewiſe, that not a few have anſwered theſe expectations: and hence the preſent Directory is encouraged to impoſe on the world fallacious arguments, with as much aſſurance as the National Convention did.

"in

"in a ſtate of uncertainty, into which it has "been thrown by ſeveral meaſures lately "adopted by the Britiſh Government, an "uncertainty in which the Engliſh nation "muſt ſhare, and which muſt be equally "unworthy of both. (38) The Executive "Council of the French Republic has con- "ſequently authoriſed the Miniſter of France "at London to demand with openneſs of the "Miniſters of his Britannic Majeſty, whe- "ther France ought to conſider England as "a neutral or hoſtile power, and has parti- "cularly charged him to obtain, on this "point, a definitive anſwer. (39) "But in

(38) Whatever unworthineſs there may be in a ſtate of uncertainty, no ſuch unworthineſs fell to the ſhare of the Britiſh Miniſters, for they were already tolerably certain in regard to the deſigns of France, and conſequently in regard to the meaſures which it was neceſſary to take at home.

(39) The beſt anſwer to this queſtion was contained in the decree of the 19th of November, in the encouragement given by the National Convention on the 28th

"demanding from the Miniſters of his Bri-
"tannic Majeſty an open and candid expla-
"nation of its intentions toward France, the
"Executive Council does not wiſh, that the
"ſmalleſt doubt ſhould exiſt reſpecting the
"diſpoſition of France toward England, and
"of its deſire to remain at peace with it.
"They even wiſh to anſwer previouſly to all

28th of the ſame month to the ſocieties, who announced their intention of overturning the Britiſh Conſtitution, in the decree of the 15th of December, and in the reſolution of the 24th of that month, not to except England from the decree of the 19th of November: to ſay nothing of the circular letter of the Marine Miniſter, and the order actually given to invade Holland, as they ſucceeded by ſeveral days Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 27th of December. In fact, after the French Government had ſolemnly declared itſelf the enemy of the Britiſh Government, it required no ſmall ſhare of aſſurance to demand a categorical anſwer, whether the latter intended to become the enemy of the former. There was only one categorical anſwer which could be given to ſuch a queſtion, namely: "ſince you are reſolved to become my enemy, I *muſt* become your's in my own defence."

"those reproaches, which may be thrown
"out against France, in order to justify
"England. Reflecting on the reasons, which
"might determine his Britannic Majesty to
"break with the French Republic, the Exe-
"cutive Council can see them only in a
"false interpretation given perhaps to the
"decree of the National Convention of the
"19th of November.(40) If the British
"Ministry are really alarmed at that decree,
"it can only be for want of comprehending
"the true meaning of it. The National
"Convention never intended that the French
"republic should favour insurrections, and
"espouse the cause of a few seditious per-
"sons, or, in a word, that it should endea-
"vour to excite disturbance in any neutral or
"friendly country whatever. Such an idea

(40) Even without so much reflexion, the Executive Council might have discovered many other reasons, which not only excited a suspicion, but proved to a demonstration that the National Convention was hostilely inclined toward the British Cabinet.

"would be rejected by the French nation. "It cannot without injuſtice be imputed to "the National Convention. "*This decree "then is applicable only to thoſe people, who, "after having conquered their liberty, may re- "queſt the fraternity and aſſiſtance of the "French republic, by a ſolemn and unequivocal "expreſſion of the general will.*" (41)

(41) This explanation is an inſtance of ſuch black hypocriſy, and ſuch daring aſſurance, as is hardly to be found but within the limits of republican France: for it was given twelve days *after* the decree of the 15th of December, in which the National Convention had ſolemnly declared, "that every nation which would *not* rebel againſt its government, ſhould be treated as an *enemy*." See Note 14 to the preceding chapter. It was given likewiſe three days after the reſolution of the 24th of December, by which the National Convention had determined, that the decree of the 19th of November ſhould be actually applied to England. And yet Mr. Chauvelin, or rather the Executive Council, was not aſhamed to aſſert, in this very note, that ſuch an idea could not without injuſtice be imputed to the National Convention, and that this venerable body, which had declared itſelf the decided enemy of all nations, which

"France not only ought and wiſhes to "reſpect the independence of England, but would not rebel againſt their governments, had no deſign whatſoever of exciting inſurrections in neutral countries. Beſides, the interpretation here given of the decree of the 19th of November, is in direct contradiction to the plain terms of the decree itſelf, which are, "la Convention Nationale accordera fraternité et ſecours à tous les peuples qui *voudront* recouvrer leur liberté," not *qui ont recouvré* leur liberté, as the interpretation implies, which in other reſpects is a manifeſt abſurdity, it being incredible, that in any country a diſaffected party, which had been able without the aſſiſtance of France to accompliſh its purpoſe, and effect a revolution, ſhould be ſo completely beſotted, as *afterwards* to require the intervention of the Great Nation. Further, the general proclamation, annexed to the decree of the 15th of December, in which the following words, "nous ſommes venus *pour chaſſer vos tyrans*," (Ch. xii. Note 22.) was put into the mouth of the French Generals, affords an additional proof, that it was not the intention of the National Convention to defer the promiſed fraternity, till the nations, for whom this ineſtimable bleſſing was deſigned, had already dethroned their ſovereigns. And that it was the grand *object* of the decree of the 19th of November to *excite* inſurrections, had been admitted by the ſame French Miniſter,

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"that alſo of its allies, with whom it is not "at war. The underſigned, therefore, has

Le Brun, from whom Chauvelin received his inſtructions. For on the 5th of December, three weeks, therefore, before Mr. Chauvelin delivered the preſent note to Lord Grenville, Le Brun in a letter to the Preſident of the National Convention announced an inſurrection in a biſhoprick of the German empire as an *happy effect* of the ſaid decree. "Citoyen Préſident, "nous éprouvons de jour en jour les heureux *effets* du "décret de la Convention Nationale, qui promet, au "nom de la nation Françaiſe, aſſiſtance et protection "aux peuples qui oſent ſecouer le joug de la tyrannie, "et qui plantent au milieu d'eux l'arbre de la liberté. "Les habitans de l'evêché de Porentru, etc.—*ſortis de* "*la loi du* 19 *Novembre*, leur courage s'eſt ranimé, etc." Moniteur, 7 Dec. 1792. (The reſult of this happy effect was the eſtabliſhment, under the auſpices of the Great Nation, of the now forgotten Rauracian republic, which, like the Ciſrhenane, preſerved a temporary exiſtence, till the mother-republic thought proper to take her daughter republics into her own boſom). In like manner, the Preſident himſelf, on the 3d of December had quoted the decree in queſtion, and introduced it with the following preface: "N'aurions-nous "*réveillé* les peuples ſouverains, detrônés par les rois, "que pour les replonger par des traités dans la ſervi-

"been charged to declare formally, *that* "*France will not attack Holland, while that* "*power confines itself, on its part, within the* "*bounds of strict neutrality.*(42)

"tude?—Notre diplome d'alliance et de défence réci-"proque eſt écrit de la main de la nature. Nos prin-"cipes et *notre haine contre les tyrans*; voilà nos minis-"tres plenipotentiaires." Moniteur, 6 Dec. 1792. (It is never to be forgotten, that, in the language of the National Convention, the words *Roi* and *Tyran* are perfectly ſynonymous). Likewiſe Rémi, a celebrated orator of the Convention ſaid, on the 2d of December: "Apprenez aux peuples à punir leurs tyrans d'une ma-"niere digne d'eux.—Si vous eleviez des doutes ſur la "condamnation du dernier de vos tyrans, ſi vous le "ſuppoſiez encore au deſſus des autres hommes, quel "exemple donneriez-vous *aux peuples à qui vous portez* "*la liberté? Ils croiraient devoir hésiter, comme vous, à* "*punir leurs tyrans.*" Ib. After the unanimous interpretations then, which had been publicly given in the Convention itſelf at the beginning of December, one of which proceeded from the Preſident, and another from the Miniſter for foreign affairs, it was expected that the Britiſh Miniſtry, at the end of the ſame month, ſhould give credit to Mr. Chauvelin's diametrically oppoſite interpretation!

(42) Yet only *fourteen days* after this ſolemn declara-

tion,

"The Britiſh Government being thus aſ-
"ſured, reſpecting the two points, no pre-

tion (which has had ſuch an effect on a celebrated Oppoſition writer, that he has aſſerted ſo late as the year 1797, "the ſecurity of Holland, while ſhe preſerved her neutrality, was profeſſed and in a manner *guaranteed*") the Executive Council ſent poſitive orders to General Miranda, to invade, within twelve days at furtheſt, Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand. (See Ch. xii. Notes 50—53.) It cannot be objected that the States General had in the mean time tranſgreſſed the bounds of neutrality, for a more ſcrupulous obſervation of them was impoſſible. An attack on France could not even have ſuggeſted itſelf to the Government of Holland; for the Dutch troops were withdrawn from the frontiers to preſerve tranquillity in the interior, which the French party in Holland threatened to diſturb; and it was the defenceleſs ſtate, in which the Dutch frontier towns were thus left, that tempted the Executive Council to give the order for invaſion. But we need not wonder at the falſity diſplayed in Mr. Chauvelin's note, ſince Briſſot, who knew all the ſecrets of the Executive Council, and was their principal agent in the National Convention, declared two days *after* the order for the invaſion of Holland had been actually given, that the French Government had no ſuch intention. His own words were: "L'agreſſion du Stadthouder envers

" tence for the leaſt difficulty can remain,
" but on the queſtion of opening the Scheldt,
" a queſtion irrevocably decided by reaſon

" la France, ou l'inſurrection contre lui de la majorité
" des Hollandais, voilà *les ſeuls cas*, ou la France croi-
" rait de ſon devoir, et de ſa juſtice, de porter les armes
" dans des Provinces-Unies : *et ces cas n'exiſtent point, et*
" *la France, en ce, veut reſter tranquille.*" Moniteur, 15 Janv. 1793. The words, " ces cas n'exiſtent point," contain likewiſe an acknowledgment, that the Stadtholder had not acted hoſtilely toward France. Laſtly, as ſoon as Briſſot had ended his ſpeech, the National Convention confirmed his declaration in regard to Holland by the following decree : " Que le Conſeil Exécutif eſt chargé de déclarer au Gouvernement d'Angleterre, que l'intention de la république Françaiſe eſt d'entretenir l'harmonie et la fraternité avec la nation Anglaiſe, de reſpecter ſon indépendance et *celle de ſes alliés*, tant que l'Angleterre et ſes alliés ne l'attaqueront pas." Ib. On the 10th of January, therefore, the French Government gave the order for the invaſion of Holland, and on the twelfth of the ſame month a *formal decree* was iſſued, containing the moſt poſitive aſſurances of the contrary. So daring and ſo ſolemn a falſehood had probably never been uttered by Statesmen of any country, till French philoſophy and French republicaniſm had ſet religion and honour at defiance.

" and

" and juſtice, of little importance in it-
" ſelf, (43) and on which the opinion of
" England, and perhaps even of Holland
" are too well known, to render it difficult
" to make it ſeriouſly the ſole cauſe of a
" war. Should the Britiſh Miniſtry, how-
" ever, embrace this laſt motive to induce
" them to declare war againſt France, would
" it not then be probable, that their private
" intention was to bring about a rupture at
" any rate, and to take the advantage at
" preſent of the moſt futile of all pretences,

(43) It was of no importance, therefore, whether the mouth of the Scheldt ſhould be converted into a ſtation for a French fleet! See what is ſaid on this ſubject in the tenth and eleventh chapters. The French Government knew, likewiſe, very well how important the mouth of the Scheldt was for *France*, or they would not have ſtipulated in the fourteenth article of the treaty, which they forced on Holland, in May, 1795, that the town and harbour of Flushing, the fortifications of which command the mouth of the Scheldt, ſhould be conſtantly garriſoned by French troops.

" to

"to colour an unjuſt aggreſſion long ago "meditated? (44)

(44) This paſſage is fraught with artifice and ſophiſtry. In the firſt place it is preſuppoſed, what is abſolutely falſe, that the appropriation of the Scheldt to France (for this was manifeſtly the meaning of what was called the opening of it) was a matter of total indifference both to England and Holland: and from theſe premiſes is deduced the inference, not that the Britiſh Miniſtry, in caſe they oppoſed the deſign, ſet too great a value on the preſervation of the Scheldt, which is the only inference, that the premiſes, even if they were true, would warrant, but that the Britiſh Miniſtry had *long ago* meditated an attack on France. Now ſince the 16th of November, 1792, the day on which the reſolution was made for the opening of the Scheldt, ſeveral other very alarming meaſures had been taken by the National Convention, which neceſſarily operated as ſtill ſtronger inducements with the Britiſh Miniſtry, to oppoſe the ambition of France. Conſequently, even if a declaration of war had proceeded from the Britiſh Government, inſtead of proceeding, as it really did, from the French Convention, and even if the opening of the Scheldt had been a matter of as little conſequence as was pretended, ſtill the natural concluſion would have been, that thoſe more alarming meaſures, that thoſe

more

"On this fatal ſuppoſition, which the "Executive Council rejects, (45) the under- "ſigned would be authoriſed to ſupport "with energy the dignity of the French "people, and to declare with firmneſs, that "a free and powerful nation will accept war, "and repel with indignation an aggreſſion "ſo manifeſtly unjuſt, and ſo unprovoked on "their part. (46) When all theſe explana-

more important motives had occaſioned the war, and not that long exiſting cauſes, which the Executive Council neither did nor could alledge, had produced it.

(45) Here the fatal ſuppoſition is rejected: but with the uſual conſiſtency of the Executive Council, it will be ſoon afterwards again aſſumed.

(46) Whoever has read the facts recorded in the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work will find it difficult, perhaps, to repreſs the indignation which he muſt neceſſarily feel at the hypocriſy and inſolence of the French Executive Council, in daring to uſe ſuch expreſſions, as "*unprovoked* aggreſſion, *purity* of the in- "tentions of France, *peaceful and conciliatory* meaſures," and the like. But though they well knew, that they

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" tions, neceſſary to demonſtrate the purity
" of the intentions of France, and when all
" peaceful and conciliatory meaſures ſhall
" have been exhauſted by the French na-
" tion, it is evident that the whole weight,
" and the whole reſponſibility of the war
" will ſooner or later fall upon thoſe who
" have provoked it. Such a war would
" really be the war of the Britiſh Miniſtry
" only againſt the French Republic: and,
" ſhould this truth appear for a moment
" doubtful, it would not perhaps be impoſ-
" ſible for France to render it ſoon evident
" to a nation, which, in giving its confi-
" dence, never renounced the exerciſe of

were uttering falſehoods, they knew likewiſe that theſe falſehoods would produce effect: they knew that they were furniſhing their advocates with the means of defence: and they knew by exprience how many thouſands were at that time ready to become the dupes of the moſt wretched artifice. It is likewiſe a matter of great importance, when a revolution of principles is to be effected, to gain the popular opinion.

" reaſon,

" reaſon, and its reſpect for juſtice and " truth. (47)

(47) " Ce ne ſerait réellement qu'une guerre du *ſeul Miniſtere* contre la *république* Françaiſe, et ſi cette vérité pouvait paraître un moment douteuſe, il ne ſerait peut-être pas difficile d'en convaincre bientôt une *nation*, qui en donnant ſa confiance, n'a jamais renoncé à l'exerciſe de ſa raiſon, à ſon reſpect pour la vérité et la juſtice." This ſentence relates to the appeal to the Engliſh *nation*, which Le Brun had already announced to the National Convention on the 19th of December, and which he ſaid he had given Chauvelin expreſs orders to make. (See Ch. xii. Note 27.) It has been ſhewn in the tenth chapter, that the French Government was at this time fully perſuaded the people of England were ripe for rebellion. Conſequently, it was ſuppoſed that nothing would more contribute to ſet this people in commotion, than an appeal to their *reaſon, and their reſpect for juſtice and truth*, namely, as is neceſſarily underſtood, and as Briſſot, in his interpretation of the appeal, openly declared (Ch. xii. Note 34.) from the *unreaſonableneſs, the injuſtice and faithleſſneſs* of their Government, from which the people would withdraw that confidence they had hitherto placed in it, and take the adminiſtration of public affairs into their own hands, as ſoon as they were convinced, (which conviction the French attempted to produce by every poſſible artifice,

"Such are the inſtructions, which the "underſigned has received orders to com-

artifice, though in vain) that the Britiſh Miniſtry *alone* wiſhed for war, and that too merely becauſe France was become a *republic*. Such is undoubtedly the meaning, though it is very artfully veiled, of the preſent paſſage in Mr. Chauvelin's note. Now, when two Governments are at variance, and in a negotiation relative to the points in diſpute, an Ambaſſador of the one receives orders, not only to uſe inſulting language to the Miniſters of the other, but to excite an inſurrection of the people, it is evident that the former Government wiſhes not for a continuance but for a breach of peace with the latter, which the circular letter of the Marine Miniſter, iſſued during this very negotiation, fully confirms. If a Britiſh Ambaſſador at Paris had ventured, in a note to the Executive Council, to threaten an appeal to the people of France, in caſe the National Convention continued to purſue its plans of conqueſt and aggrandizement, and to intermeddle in the domeſtic concerns of neutral nations, though ſuch an appeal would have been much more juſtifiable, than that with which the Britiſh Government was threatened, yet there can be no doubt, that he would either have received for anſwer an order to quit the country, or would have been committed to the Temple, as an exciter of ſedition, for, under the republican Government of France,

the

"municate officially to Lord Grenville, in-
"viting him, as well as all the Council of
"his Britannic Majeſty, to weigh, with
"the moſt ſerious attention, the delibera-
"tions and demands which they contain.
"It is evident, that the French nation de-
"ſires to preſerve peace with England. It
"proves this by endeavouring to remove
"every ſuſpicion, which ſo many paſſions
"and various prejudices are continually la-
"bouring to excite againſt it. (48) But the

the impriſonment of foreign Miniſters takes place at Paris as well as at Algiers. Laſtly, it is not improbable that the Executive Council, beſide the grand motive of exciting an inſurrection in England, had an additional reaſon for their inſolent conduct: they wiſhed probably to irritate the Britiſh Miniſtry, and to provoke a declaration of war already determined at Paris, in order to avoid the reproach of being the firſt aggreſſors. But in this they were wholly diſappointed: for Lord Grenville replied to the menace with a temperate firmneſs, which the French themſelves hardly expected.

(48) It was not paſſion and prejudice, but the own acts and declarations of the National Convention recorded

"more it ſhall have done to convince all "Europe of the purity of its views, and the "rectitude of its intentions, (49) the greater "right it will have to a claim of being no "longer miſunderſtood. (50)

corded in the Moniteur itſelf, which excited the ſuſpicion, and more than ſuſpicion, of hoſtile deſigns againſt Great Britain. Nor did the preſent negotiation contribute in the leaſt to the diminution of it."

(49) *Purity* of the views, and *rectitude* of the intentions, diſplayed by the National Convention on the 19th and 28th of November, and the 15th and 24th of December!

(50) It is true that their views were miſunderſtood, and very ſtrangely miſunderſtood, eſpecially by ſome, though perhaps not by all of their friends and advocates: but they were not miſunderſtood by the Britiſh Miniſtry, who clearly ſaw the point to which they were directed. Gentlemen of the oppoſition party likewiſe appear at preſent to have diſcovered the drift of French politicks, as we may judge from an admirable ſpeech delivered in the Houſe of Commons on the 20th of April, 1798, on which Mr. Pitt very juſtly remarked, that if reſiſtance to the ambition of republican

France

"The underſigned has orders to demand "a written anſwer to the preſent note. He "hopes that the Miniſters of his Britannic "Majeſty will be induced by the explana- "tions, which it contains, to adopt ideas fa- "vourable to a good underſtanding between "the two nations; and will have no occa- "ſion, in order to return to them, to conſi- "der the terrible reſponſibility of a declara- "tion of war, which would inconteſtibly "be their work; (51) the conſequences of

France had been deferred till the period, when the honourable gentleman became convinced of its neceſſity, the Houſe of Commons would have ceaſed to be the theatre of his oratorical talents.

(51) If this poſition was ſo eaſy to be proved, why did not the Executive Council attempt the proof of it? And why did they not compare their own conduct, even to the niceſt detail, with that of the Britiſh Government, if they were convinced that the compariſon would illuſtrate the pretended purity of their views, and the vaunted rectitude of their intentions? In fact, they

"which must be fatal to both countries, and "to all mankind, *and in which a generous* "*and free people could not long consent to be-* "*tray their own interests, by serving to assist* "*and support a tyrannical coalition.*" (52)

Signed CHAUVELIN.

well knew that such a comparison would illustrate only the baseness of their designs, and therefore they very prudently avoided it. Their object was, not to investigate the truth, which would have been highly prejudicial to them, but to lead those into error, whom it was their interest to deceive.

(52) "Dans laquelle un peuple généreux et libre ne pourrait consentir long-tems à trahir ses propres intérêts, en servant d'auxiliare et de renfort à une coalition tyrannique." Here we have another allusion to the threatened appeal to the people of Great Britain, whose generosity is extolled, not out of any regard entertained for them by the French Executive Council, but in order to separate the people from the Government, to gain over the former by the aid of flattery for the French cause, and, by the assistance of an odious contrast, to place the conduct of the latter, if possible, in a detestable light. By this artifice, the rulers of France endeavoured

When we reflect, that the oſtenſible object of this note was to remove the cauſes of thoſe complaints, which had been made by the Britiſh Government, and to effect a reconciliation with that of France, we muſt acknowledge that it is a very ſingular phenomenon in diplomatic hiſtory. Whenever

voured to excite the Britiſh nation againſt the Britiſh Government, and to work the one againſt the other, that both might at length fall a prey to French ambition: for they imagined that the people of Great Britain were ſo eaſy to be duped, as to be capable of being converted into inſtruments of French ambition, as Barbaroux ſaid in the National Convention on the 1ſt of February: "J'ai eſpérance de voir le peuple Anglais ſortir enfin de la ſtupeur,—et *nous* venger *lui-même* d'une Cour, etc." Moniteur, 3d Feb. 1793. And that they expected the artifice would ſoon ſucceed, appears from the expreſſion in Mr. Chauvelin's note: "ne pourrait conſentir *long-tems* à trahir ſes propres intérêts." Laſtly, the aſſertion which is here manifeſtly implied, that the Britiſh Government, in oppoſing the French Convention, acted with treachery to the Britiſh nation, was as inſolent as it was artful.

it is the *real* intention of one Cabinet to regain the loſt friendſhip of another, it is uſual to adopt polite and conciliatory language: but when one Government, which has already threatened another with imminent danger, ſays to that other Government, at the very outſet of a negotiation apparently deſigned to reſtore harmony between them, "if the armament which you have begun (and which, in the preſent caſe, as has been clearly proved, was merely defenſive) be ſtill continued, we ſhall appeal to your people, which will not long conſent to betray their own intereſts, by ſerving to ſupport a tyrannical coalition," it is evident that the real object of that Government is *not* to effect a reconciliation. In fact, Mr. Chauvelin's note was ſo far from removing the cauſes of thoſe complaints, which the Britiſh Government had very juſtly made, that it only added new injuries and inſults: and if Miniſters had

had refuſed to return any anſwer, it may at leaſt be doubted, whether they would have merited cenſure. Nay, if ſuch a negotiator as Mr. Chauvelin, a man who was ſowing the ſeeds of civil war, while he affected to be a miniſter of peace, had been ordered on the receipt of this note, to depart immediately from the kingdom, it would have been nothing more than what the French Executive Council would have done under ſimilar circumſtances. But ſo deſirous was the Britiſh Adminiſtration of preventing, if poſſible, an open rupture with France, that Mr. Chauvelin was permitted to remain, till it was found that all further negotiation muſt be fruitleſs, and that the French Government, inſtead of offering ſatisfaction for the paſt, and ſecurity for the future, confirmed, by the negotiation itſelf, the ſuſpicion of its deſigns, to involve Great Britain both in foreign and domeſtic war.

Four days, therefore, after the receipt of Mr. Chauvelin's note, Lord Grenville returned the following anſwer. (53)

"Whitehall, Dec. 31, 1792.

"Sir,

"I have received from you a note, in "which, ſtyling yourſelf Miniſter Plenipo- "tentiary of France, you communicate to "me, as the King's Secretary of State, the "inſtructions, which you ſtate to have your- "ſelf received from the Executive Council "of the French Republic. You are not ig- "norant, that ſince the unhappy events of "the 10th of Auguſt, the King has thought "proper to ſuſpend all *official* communica- "tions with France. (54) You are your-

(53) The French original is printed in the Moniteur, 14th January, 1793.

(54) See what is ſaid on this ſubject in the ninth chapter.

"ſelf

" ſelf no otherwiſe accredited to the King,
" than in the name of his Moſt Chriſtian
" Majeſty. The propoſition of receiving a
" Miniſter accredited by any other authority
" or power in France, would be a new queſ-
" tion, which, whenever it ſhould occur,
" the King would have a right to decide ac-
" cording to the intereſts of his ſubjects, his
" own dignity, and the regard which he
" owes to his allies, and to the general ſyſ-
" tem of Europe. I am, therefore, to inform
" you, Sir, in expreſs and formal terms, that
" I acknowledge you in no other public cha-
" racter, than that of Miniſter from his Moſt
" Chriſtian Majeſty, and that, conſequently,
" you cannot be admitted to treat with the
" King's Miniſters *in the quality and under*
" *the form ſtated in your note.* (55)

(55) " Dans la qualité et ſous la forme dont il eſt
" queſtion dans votre note." That when Lord Grenville returned this anſwer, Mr. Chauvelin had received no other credentials, than thoſe which had been given him by Louis XVI appears from a paſſage in the note

"But obſerving that you have entered "into explanations of ſome of the circum-

of the Executive Council of the 7th of January, 1793, in which is ſaid of Mr. Chauvelin "quoiqu'il ne ſoit "accrédité auprès de ſa Majeſté Britannique que de la "part du ci-devant Roi." Moniteur, 14 Janv. 1793. Indeed it was in the note of the 7th of January, which was delivered to Lord Grenville on the 13th of that month, that the Executive Council firſt announced to the Britiſh Miniſtry its intention of furniſhing Mr. Chauvelin with new credentials. On the 31ſt of December, 1792, therefore, he had no other *public* character, than that with which he had been inveſted by Louis XVI., and if the Britiſh Cabinet had been ever ſo diſpoſed to acknowledge, at this early period, the French Republic in due form (a queſtion, which Lord Grenville leaves here undetermined), ſtill it was not in its power on the 31ſt of December, to admit Mr. Chauvelin as the *accredited* Miniſter of the French Republic, becauſe he had neither delivered, nor had even himſelf received, any letters of credence from the adminiſtrators of that Republic. Conſequently it was impoſſible to admit him to treat with the King's Miniſters "in the quality and under the form ſtated in his note." But Lord Grenville had already declared to him "*that outward forms would be no hindrance to his Britannic Majeſty*," whenever the queſtion relating to explanations,

which

" ſtances, which have given to England ſuch " ſtrong grounds of uneaſineſs and jealouſy, " (56) and that you ſpeak of theſe explana-

which might be ſatisfactory and advantageous to both parties. See note 4 to this chapter. The queſtion, therefore, whether the differences ſubſiſting between the two parties could be amicably ſettled or not, depended not on the form, but on the *ſubſtance* of the negociation: it depended upon this, whether the French Executive Council, whatever might be the organ through which it ſpake, really gave explanations, which were ſatisfactory, and aſſurances, on which the Britiſh Government could rely.

(56) Well might Lord Grenville ſay "*ſome* of the circumſtances, which had given uneaſineſs to England:" for Mr. Chauvelin's note contained no alluſion whatſoever, either to the declaration of the National Convention on the 25th of November, that it was ready to aſſiſt in overturning the Britiſh conſtitution, or to the decree of the 15th of December, which declared hoſtilities againſt every nation, which refuſed to take up arms againſt its government, or to the determination of the National Convention on the 24th of December, that the decree of the 19th of November ſhould be actually applied to England.

" tions

"tions as being of a nature to bring our "two countries nearer, (57) I have been un- "willing to convey to you the notification "ſtated above, without at the ſame time "explaining myſelf clearly and diſtinctly on "the ſubject of what you have communi- "cated to me, though under a form which "is neither regular nor official.

"Your explanations are confined to three "points. The firſt is that of the decree of "the National Convention of the 19th of "November, in the expreſſions of which all "England ſaw the formal declaration of a "deſign to extend univerſally the new prin- "ciples of government adopted in France, "and to encourage diſorder and revolt in all "countries, *even in thoſe which are neu-*

(57) It is true, that Mr. Chauvelin *ſpoke* of them as ſuch: but whether they really were ſo, the reader will eaſily determine from the notes 41 and 42 to this chapter.

"*tral.*

" *tral.* (58) If this interpretation, which you " represent as injurious to the Convention, " could admit of any doubt, it is but too " well juſtified by the conduct of the Con- " vention itſelf: *and the application of theſe* " *principles to the King's dominions has been* " *ſhewn unequivocally by the public reception* " *given to the promoters of ſedition in this* " *country, and by the ſpeeches made to them* " *preciſely at the time of this decree, and ſince* " *on ſeveral different occaſions.* (59)

" Yet, notwithſtanding all theſe proofs, " *ſupported by other circumſtances* which are " too notorious, (60) it would have been,

(58) The eleventh article of the decree of 15th December (Ch. xii. Note 54), is a general proof of this aſſertion: and the reſolution of the 24th of December (Ib. Note 14), is a particular proof of it in regard to England.

(59) See Ch. x. p. 203—212.

(60) See Ch. x. p. 222—238.

" w

" with pleaſure that we ſhould have ſeen
" here ſuch explanations, and ſuch a con-
" duct, as would have ſatisfied the dignity
" and honour of England, with reſpect to
" what has already paſſed, and would have
" offered a ſufficient ſecurity in future for
" the maintenance of that reſpect toward
" the rights, the government, and the tran-
" quillity of neutral powers, which they
" have on every account the right to ex-
" pect."

" Neither this ſatisfaction, nor this ſecu-
" rity, is found in the terms of an explana-
" tion, *which ſtill declares to the promoters of*
" *ſedition in every country, what are the caſes*
" *in which they may count beforehand on the*
" *ſupport and ſuccour of France, and which re-*
" *ſerves to that country the right of mixing*
" *herſelf in our internal affairs whenever ſhe*
" *ſhall judge it proper, and on principles in-*
" *compatible with the political inſtitutions of all*
" *the*

"*the countries of Europe.* No one can avoid "perceiving how much a declaration like "this is calculated to encourage diſorder and "revolt in every country. (61) No one can "be ignorant how contrary it is to the re- "ſpect which is reciprocally due from inde- "pendent nations, nor how repugnant to "thoſe principles, which the King has fol- "lowed, on his part, by forbearing at all "times from any interference whatever in "the internal affairs of France. (62) And

(61) Conſequently the explanation, which the French Executive Council gave of the decree in queſtion, was ſo far from affording ſatisfaction for the paſt, and ſecurity for the future, that it only increaſed the inſult already offered, and magnified the danger with which Great Britain was already threatened.

(62) The acknowledgment of Le Brun, the French Miniſter for foreign affairs, on this ſubject, at the latter end of Auguſt 1792, has been already quoted at the beginning of the ninth chapter: and that the Britiſh Cabinet had continued to preſerve the moſt ſtrict neutrality toward France, even to the period when Lord Grenville wrote the preſent note, was admitted by the National Convent

"this contraſt is alone ſufficient to ſhew, "not only that England cannot conſider "ſuch an explanation as ſatisfactory, but "that ſhe muſt look upon it as *a freſh avowal* "*of thoſe diſpoſitions, which ſhe ſees with ſo* "*juſt an uneaſineſs and jealouſy.*

"I proceed to the two other points of "your explanation, which concern the ge- "neral diſpoſitions of France with regard to

Convention itſelf on the 13th of January 1793. For the introduction to this decree runs thus: "La Con- "vention Nationale informée par le Miniſtre des af- "faires étrangères, des préparatifs extraordinaires de "l'Angleterre, conſidérant le changement de conduite "de ce pays relativement *au caractere de neutralité qu'il* "*avait conſervée juſqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France,* "*etc.*" Moniteur, 16 Janvier, 1793. With reſpect to the ſudden change in the conduct of the Britiſh Adminiſtration, which is here made a ſubject of complaint, it was the unavoidable conſequence of the meaſures, which had been taken by the Convention itſelf: for it is obvious, that, when one nation is threatened by another, it muſt put itſelf in a poſture of defence.

"the

"the allies of Great Britain, and the con-
"duct of the Convention and its officers re-
"lative to the Scheldt. The declaration,
"which you there make, that France will
"not attack Holland, ſo long as that power
"ſhall obſerve an exact neutrality, is con-
"ceived nearly in the ſame terms with that,
"which you were charged to make in the
"name of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty in the
"month of June laſt. (63) Since that firſt
"declaration was made, an officer, ſtating
"himſelf to be employed in the ſervice of
"France, has openly violated both the ter-
"ritory and the neutrality of the republic,
"in going up the Scheldt, to attack the ci-

(63) The following is the paſſage in Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 18th June, to which Lord Grenville here alludes. "Il s'empreſſe en même tems de lui déclarer, conformément au déſir énoncé dans cette réponſe, que les droits de tous les alliés de la Grande Bretagne qui n'auront point provoqué la France par des démarches hoſtiles, ſeront par lui non moins religieuſement reſpectés." Moniteur, 20th July, 1792.

"tadel

" tadel of Antwerp, *notwithſtanding the de-*
" *termination of the government not to grant*
" *this paſſage, and the formal proteſt by which*
" *they oppoſed it.* (64) Since the ſame de-
" claration was made, the Convention has
" thought itſelf authoriſed to annul the
" rights of the republic exerciſed within the
" limits of its own territory, and enjoyed by
" virtue of the ſame treaties, by which her
" independence is ſecured. And at the very
" moment, when, under the name of an
" amicable explanation, you renew to me in
" the ſame terms the promiſe of reſpecting
" the independence and the rights of Eng-
" land and her allies, you announce to me,
" *that thoſe, in whoſe name you ſpeak, intend*
" *to maintain theſe open and injurious aggreſ-*
" *ſions. It is certainly not on ſuch a declara-*
" *tion as this, that any reliance can be placed*
" *for the continuance of public tranquillity.*

(64) See Ch. x. Note 10, and Ch. xi. Note 7.

" But

"But I am unwilling to leave without a "more particular reply, what you ſay on the "ſubject of the Scheldt. If it were true, "that this queſtion is in itſelf of little im- "portance, this would ſerve only to prove "more clearly, that it was brought forward "only for the purpoſe of inſulting the al- "lies of England by the infraction of their "neutrality, and by the violation of their "rights, which the faith of treaties obliges "us to maintain. But you cannot be ig- "norant that here the utmoſt importance is "attached to thoſe principles, which France "wiſhes to eſtabliſh by this proceeding, and "to thoſe conſequences which would natu- "rally reſult from them: (65) and that not

(65) The dangerous conſequences both to England and to Holland, which neceſſarily reſulted from the opening of the Scheldt, when France was in poſſeſſion of the Low Countries, have been ſhewn in Ch. x. p. 196, and Ch. xi. p. 254—258. With reſpect to the

 principles,

" only thoſe principles, and thoſe conſe-
" quences, will never be admitted by Eng-
" land, but that ſhe is, and ever will be, ready
" to oppoſe them with all her force.

" France can have no right to annul the
" ſtipulations relative to the Scheldt, unleſs
" ſhe have alſo the right to ſet aſide equally
" all the other treaties between all the powers
" of Europe, and all the other rights of
" England, or of her allies. She can have
" even no pretence to interfere in the queſ-
" tion of opening the Scheldt, unleſs ſhe
" were the ſovereign of the Low Countries,

principles, which the French Republican Government wiſhed to eſtabliſh by this proceeding, they implied nothing leſs than, that the modern rulers of France poſſeſſed the right, not only to intermeddle in the internal affairs of neutral nations, but to act as the arbitrators of all Europe. In fact, they have both aſſumed this right, and have exerciſed it during ſeven years, with almoſt unremitted ſucceſs.

" or

" or had the right to dictate laws to all Eu-
" rope.

" England will never conſent that France
" ſhall arrogate the power of annulling at
" her pleaſure, and under pretence of a pre-
" tended natural right, of which ſhe makes
" herſelf the only judge, the political ſyſ-
" tem of Europe, eſtabliſhed by ſolemn trea-
" ties, and guaranteed by the conſent of all
" the powers. This Government, adhering
" to the maxims which it has followed for
" more than a century, will alſo never ſee
" with indifference that France ſhall make
" herſelf, either directly or indirectly, ſove-
" reign of the Low Countries, or general
" arbitreſs of the rights and liberties of Eu-
" rope. *If France is really deſirous of main-*
" *taining friendſhip and peace with England,*
" *ſhe muſt ſhew herſelf diſpoſed to renounce her*
" *views of aggreſſion and aggrandizement,*
" *and to confine herſelf within her own terri-*

"tory, without inſulting other governments, "without diſturbing their tranquillity, with- "out violating their rights. (66)

(66) "Si la France déſire réellement de conſerver l'amitié et la paix avec l'Angleterre, il faut qu'elle ſe montre diſpoſée á *renoncer à ſes vues d'agreſſion et d'aggrandiſſement, et à ſe tenir à ſon propre territoire, ſans outrager les autres gouvernemens, ſans troubler leur repos, ſans violer leurs droits.*" By this clear and preciſe declaration of the conditions, under which the Britiſh Cabinet was willing to continue at peace with France, and without which, peace could not poſſibly be maintained, the negociation was brought to a criſis: and the iſſue of it now depended entirely on the queſtion, whether the National Convention would renounce its views of conqueſt and aggrandizement, and ceaſe to interfere in the internal concerns of neutral nations, to infringe on their privileges, and diſturb their tranquillity. If the National Convention thought proper to ſubmit to theſe conditions, which, on the one hand were abſolutely neceſſary for the preſervation of Great Britain, and, on the other hand could not be conſidered as injurious to France, becauſe they were nothing more than what the French Government itſelf had repeatedly declared to be the baſis of their new ſyſtem of politicks. Peace was preſerved, whether France were a monarchy or a republic,

" With reſpect to that character of ill-
" will, which is endeavoured to be found in
" the conduct of England toward France, I
" cannot diſcuſs it, becauſe you ſpeak of it
" in general terms only, without alledging a
" ſingle fact. All Europe has ſeen the juſ-
" tice and the generoſity which have cha-
" racteriſed the conduct of the King. *His*
" *Majeſty has always been deſirous of peace:*
" *he deſires it ſtill, but ſuch as may be real*
" *and ſolid, and conſiſtent with the intereſts*
" *and dignity of his own dominions, and with*
" *the general ſecurity of Europe.* (67)

republic, for no alluſion whatſoever was made in theſe conditions to any particular form of government. But if the National Convention rejected the conditions, they confirmed the ſuſpicions already entertained: and left the Britiſh Miniſters no other choice, than either to prepare for a ſerious combat, or to ſacrifice their country to the ambition of France.

(67) " Sa Majeſté a toujours déſiré la paix. Elle la déſire encore, mais réelle et ſolide, et telle qu'elle ſoit compatible avec les intérêts et la dignité de ſes états, et

"On the reſt of your paper I ſay nothing. As to what relates to me and to my col-
"leagues, the King's Miniſters owe to his
"Majeſty the account of their conduct:
"and I have no anſwer to give to you on
"this ſubject, any more than on that of *the*
"*appeal which you propoſe to make to the Eng-*
"*liſh nation.* (68) This nation, according
"to that conſtitution by which its liberty
"and its proſperity are ſecured, and which
"it will always be able to defend againſt
"every attack, direct or indirect, will never
"have with foreign powers connection or
"correſpondence, except through the organ
"of its King: of a King whom it loves and

avec la ſureté générale de l'Europe." Here reference is again made to the conditions, which had been already preciſely determined.

(68) Beſides the inſinuation in Mr. Chauvelin's note, ſee the declarations made on this ſubject in the National Convention by Le Brun and Briſſot, Ch. xii. Notes 29, 30, 32, where Lord Grenville's obſervations on it are quoted likewiſe in the French original.

"reveres,

" reverſe, and who has never for an inſtant
" ſeparated his rights, and his happineſs,
" from the rights, the intereſts, and the hap-
" pineſs of his people. (69)

" (Signed) GRENVILLE."

(69) This note is written with the coo'neſs and dignity of a ſtateſman, who is conſcious of having juſtice on his ſide, and forms a ſtriking contraſt with the menacing language adopted in Mr. Chauvelin's note: and this contraſt is the more remarkable, when we conſider that the Britiſh Secretary of State was doomed to notice not only unprovoked aggreſſions, but explanations ſtill more diſguſting and inſolent, than the aggreſſions themſelves. Yet there are writers, even of our own country, who have ventured to declare that no one can compare the *temperate* language of the memorials from the Executive Council of France with the *inſufferable arrogance* viſible in the notes of Lord Grenville, without drawing a concluſion greatly to the diſadvantage of the latter. Such an aſſertion is quite in character, and correſponds exactly with the tone adopted by the French themſelves, who during the late negociation at Raſtadt, after all that part of Germany, which lies to the weſt of the Rhine, together with the Auſtrian Netherlands had been formally ceded to them, after they had made themſelves maſters of Holland and Italy, and

Two days after Lord Grenville had communicated this anſwer to Mr. Chauvelin, Mr. Miles wrote a letter to Le Brun, the French Miniſter for Foreign Affairs, on the ſubject of the pending negotiation: and as this letter is a document of ſome importance, and throws conſiderable light on the hiſtory of French politicks, it will be neceſſary to make from it a few extracts. (70) It is dated Cleveland-row, 2d. Jan. 1793, and begins thus: "You always expreſs, Sir, in your "different reports to the Convention, and in

after they had conquered Switzerland in the midſt of the negociation, continually talked of the *great ſacrifices* which *France* had made, in order to obtain peace. One ſhould really ſuppoſe that French republicans poſſeſſed the privilege of ſetting common ſenſe at defiance.

(70) The French original is printed in the Authentic Correſpondence of Mr. Miles with Le Brun, Appendix, p. 92—98. I do not quote the whole of this letter here, becauſe ſeveral parts of it relate to other things, and have been already introduced in various places, as the ſubjects required.

"the

" the diſpatches which I have ſeen, the de-
" ſire of preſerving peace between England
" and France: but what reliance can be
" had on *proteſtations which are contradicted*
" *by facts?* How is it poſſible to believe your
" *intentions* pacific, while your *conduct* is hoſ-
" tile? Do we live in an age when enigmas
" are in vogue, or is it neceſſary, in order to
" comprehend your meaning, to read, what
" you write, backward? (71) It is a me-
" lancholy truth, Sir, that proſperity dazzles
" nations, as well as individuals, and that
" great calamities are ſometimes neceſſary to
" teach them juſtice and moderation. The
" rapidity of your conqueſts in the Auſtrian
" Netherlands, in Germany, and in Savoy,
" made you loſe ſight of what you owe to
" yourſelves and others: and becauſe you
" ſucceeded, by the intrepidity of your arms,

(71) The paſſage, which immediately follows relates to Mr. Maret, and has been quoted in this chapter, Note 18.

" againſt

" againſt ſome governments, naturally weak, " and already infected with the contagion of " the times, you thought you could dictate " laws to all Europe, and force it to adopt " the ſame principles of anarchy, of which " you have been the victims ſince the 14th of " July, 1789." Mr. Miles, after a long paſſage, in which he endeavours to prove the pacific diſpoſition of the Britiſh Cabinet, (72) then proceeds as follows: " Recall all " your emiſſaries, put an end to your pro- " paganda, and no longer ſtrive to diſturb " the public tranquillity in this country. " Your decrees of the 19th of November, " and 15th of December,* are menaces

(72) See Ch. xi. Note 51.

* " I had reaſon to believe that theſe decrees were levelled at this country, in conſequence of the deluſion, which prevailed in France, that we were on the eve of an inſurrection in England, and that the promiſe of ſupport would inſtantly produce an exploſion. *Note of Mr. Miles.*

" which

" which no government can bear, without
" taking measures of precaution immediately
" for its own safety: and while such decrees
" exist, we cannot rely on your *pacific assur-*
" *ances*. Besides, when *you* express your sen-
" timents directly contrary to the explicit
" declarations of the *Convention*, you can
" only be considered as a private individual.
" In the name of God, if you wish to avoid
" an universal conflagration, do not meddle
" with our government. *If* we are less free
" than you, if we were even in the most ab-
" ject state of slavery, let us and our chains
" alone; and as you do not feel them, why
" trouble yourselves about them? I dwell
" the more willingly on this article, as I am
" no stranger to the groundless hopes you
" have conceived of a general revolt: and
" while you *encourage such schemes*, it will be
" impossible for me to assist you, or even to
" hold any correspondence with you, or the
" Executive Council." Lastly, after having

once more aſſured Le Brun, that the Britiſh Cabinet was ſincerely diſpoſed to preſerve peace, and that it would not enter into a war, unleſs forced to it, either as a meaſure of precaution, or as a meaſure of neceſſity, to repel an aggreſſion on the part of France,(73) he made to the French Miniſter the following declaration. "This country would not "be averſe to an arrangement dictated more "by imperious circumſtances than by juſ-"tice. I have propoſed this arrangement as "the only condition on which you would "agree to give up the Scheldt, renounce "your conqueſts, and grant peace to Pruſſia "and Auſtria. (74) *It is for the Executive "power (Council) to decide.*"

(73) Mr. Miles's own words in the French original were. "ne rendez pas la guerre néceſſaire, ni comme meſure de précaution, ni par néceſſité pour repouſſer une agreſſion de votre part, *et vous ne l'aurez pas:* comptez là-deſſus, et je répondrai du reſte.

(74) Mr. Miles has not explained in what the propoſed arrangement conſiſted: nor is it eaſy to diſcover it

On the 7th of January, 1793, after the French Executive Council had received Lord

it from the contents of this letter alone. In the ſentence immediately preceding, where it is natural to look for an explanation, he had ſaid: "Be wiſe, and you "will reſtore liberty to Liege and Brabant: the empire "and the Emperor will have nothing to ſay, and a brave "and loyal people will be freed from a yoke, which "has long oppreſſed them."—But, as Mr. Miles himſelf ſays, that the arrangement, which he had propoſed, was dictated more by imperious circumſtances, than by juſtice, he could not allude to the juſt-mentioned ſettlement in regard to Liege and Brabant, becauſe he repreſents *that* arrangement as perfectly conſiſtent with juſtice. Beſides, he ſays to Le Brun, that he had propoſed the arrangement in queſtion, as the only condition on which the Executive Council would conſent to renounce its conqueſts: but it is a certain fact, as will preſently appear, that the erecting of Brabant and Liege into an independent republic was a condition, to which the Executive Council was reſolved not to ſubmit. The arrangement in queſtion, therefore, muſt mean ſomething elſe: and as Mr. Miles had been already informed in a letter, dated Paris, 17th December, 1792, that the Executive Council would inſiſt on the formal acknowledgment of the French Republic as a *ſine quâ non* (Authentic Correſpondence, Appendix, p. 83), we may conclude that

the

Grenville's note of the 31ſt of December, and Le Brun, who, in all matters relative to foreign affairs, was the principal perſon in it,

the arrangement, which Mr. Miles propoſed to the Britiſh Miniſtry, as an indiſpenſable condition of peace, was no other than the required acknowledgment of the French Republic, eſpecially as he ſays it was dictated rather by imperious circumſtances, than by juſtice. If this concluſion be juſt, the Britiſh Miniſtry, according to Mr. Miles's own account, would have conſented at the cloſe of the year 1792, to have acknowledged the French Republic, had this Republic conſented to renounce all views of conqueſt and aggrandizement. The words of the original are: On n'eſt pas du tout éloigné d'un arrangement, que les circonſtances impérieuſes ont peut-être dicté beaucoup plus que la juſtice. But whether this or any other arrangement was meant, Mr. Miles repreſented the acceptance of it by the Britiſh Miniſtry as a mark of great moderation: and in the ſentence immediately following that, which was laſt quoted, he ſaid to Le Brun, "if you decline an arrangement *ſo reaſonable* (un arrangement ſi raiſonnable), a calamitous war will be the conſequence. The refuſal, therefore, or acceptance of it on the part of the Executive Council decided the iſſue of the negotiation. But we ſhall ſee from their note, which was dated the 7th of January, and conſequently after Le Brun had received

had likewiſe received Mr. Miles's letter of the 2d of January, the following note which, as will appear from the cloſe of it, was the *ultimatum* of the French Government, was ſigned by Le Brun in the name of the Executive Council, and ſent to Mr. Chauvelin, who, on the 13th of January, communicated it to Lord Grenville. (75)

ceived the preſent letter from Mr. Miles, for it was immediately ſent to Paris in a diſpatch from Noel (Authentic Correſpondence, Appendix. p. 105), that they ſtill perſiſted in the opening of the Scheldt, in the occupation of the Netherlands as long as they thought proper, and in the right to interfere in the internal concerns of neutral nations, in caſes which they reſerved to themſelves to determine. Their object, therefore, was not merely to found a republic in France, but to acquire unlimited dominion over *other* nations.

(75) The French original is printed in the Moniteur, 14th January, 1793, and is ſuperſcribed: Note officielle du Pouvoir Exécutif de France, en réponſe à celle du Miniſtre Britannique. Paris, le 7 Janvier, 1793, l'an deuxieme de la République.—In the New Annual Regiſter for 1793, where the Engliſh tranſlation of this note is printed, an error of the preſs has taken place in regard to the date, namely 4 inſtead of 7.

"I

"The provisional Executive Council of "the French Republic, before they reply "more particularly to each of the points "comprehended in the note remitted to "them on the part of the Minister of his "Britannic Majesty, will begin by repeating "to that Minister the most express assur-"ances of their sincere desire to maintain "peace and harmony between France and "England. The sentiments of the French "nation toward the English have been ma-"nifested, during the whole course of the "revolution, in so constant, so unanimous a "manner, that there cannot remain the "smallest doubt of the esteem which it "vows to them, and of its desire to have "them for friends. (76)

(76) It cannot be denied that the National Convention had manifested its sentiments to many Englishmen, (especially to those, who on November 28th, signified their intention of overturning the British Constitution) in so constant, so unanimous a manner, that there could not remain the smallest doubt of the esteem, which it vowed

"It is then with great reluctance that the "Republic would ſee itſelf forced to a rup-"ture, much more contrary to its inclination

vowed to *them*, and of its deſire to have *them* for friends, or, more properly ſpeaking, for dupes. In addition to the documents quoted in the tenth chapter from the Moniteur, as proofs of *this* kind of friendſhip, may be alledged the fête civique, celebrated at White's Hotel, in Paris, on November 18, the day before the celebrated decree in favour of univerſal inſurrection was voted. This feſtival is deſcribed at length in Rivington's Annual Regiſter for 1792, part ii. p. 153—155. The company was compoſed of Britiſh, French, and ſome few perſons from other nations: ſeveral members of the National Convention were preſent, likewiſe Generals Dillon, Santerre and Bruyere, with Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Thomas Payne, and other well-known characters. After dinner the following, among many other, toaſts were drunk. "The National Convention of France." "The Patriotic Societies of Great Britain and Ireland, with thoſe who have contributed to inform and enlighten the people, Prieſtley, Fox, Sheridan, Barlow," &c.—"*The approaching National Convention of Great Britain and Ireland.*"—"May Revolutions never be made *by halves.*"

" than to its *intereſt*. (77) Before it proceeds " to ſuch a diſagreeable extremity, explana- " tions are neceſſary; and the object of them

(77) From this declaration the Britiſh Government could draw no other concluſion, than that an open attack on the part of France was not far diſtant: for, as the French rulers themſelves declared, that a rupture with England would not be contrary to their *intereſt*, one might be certain, that their thirſt after conqueſt and dominion, on which no man, who has read the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work, can entertain a doubt, would ſhortly derive new gratification in a war with England. The reaſon why they ſuppoſed that a war with England would be ſo advantageous to them, has been already aſſigned in the tenth chapter. They imagined, namely, that the diſaffected party in England (as was afterwards the caſe in Ireland) would immediately join them, that a civil war would be the conſequence, and that both parties (for they conſidered the diſaffected merely as inſtruments in their own hands) would at length fall a prey to French avarice and ambition. Their pretended friendſhip, therefore, for the Engliſh democrats (for they certainly had none for the nation at large) was nothing more than a ſnare: and, without doubt, they have often laughed in their hearts, that

" is ſo highly important, that the Executive
" Council have not thought that they could
" intruſt them to a ſecret agent always to be
" diſavowed. (78) For this reaſon they have
" thought proper, under every point of view,
" to intruſt them to Citizen Chauvelin,
" *though he is not accredited to his Britannic*
" *Majeſty but from the late King.*

" The opinion of the Executive Council
" on this occaſion is juſtified by the manner
" in which our negotiations are at the ſame

that ſo many thouſands have been dupes enough to fall into it. And with regard to thoſe advocates of the French, who have deſcribed the Britiſh Miniſters as the authors of the war, they could have no right to lay this accuſation, even were it founded on truth: for no advocate can conſiſtently cenſure a ſtep, which his client himſelf declares to be agreeable to his own intereſt.

(78) This obſervation was intended as an excuſe for their refuſal to ſend inſtructions to Mr. Maret, with

" time carried on in Spain, where Citizen " Burgoign was exactly in the ſame ſituation " as Citizen Chauvelin at London, which, " however, has not prevented the Miniſter " of the Catholic King from treating with " him (79) on a convention of neutrality, " the ratification of which is to be exchanged " at Paris between the Miniſter for foreign " affairs and the Chargé des affaires of Spain. " We will even add, that the principal Mi- " niſter of his Catholic Majeſty, when writ- " ing officially on this ſubject to Citizen " Burgoign, did not forget to give him " his title of Miniſter Plenipotentiary of

whom Mr. Pitt had expreſſed a deſire to negotiate, and who was undoubtedly much better qualified to have prevented a rupture than Mr. Chauvelin. But for this very reaſon he did not ſuit the purpoſe of the Executive Council.

(79) We have ſeen, likewiſe, that nothing prevented the Miniſters of his Britannic Majeſty from treating with Citizen Chauvelin.

" France

"France. (80) The example of a power of
"the firſt rank, ſuch as Spain, might have
"induced the Executive Council to hope,

(80) Miniſtre Plenipotentiaire de France."—Now, as Mr. Chauvelin, when he delivered his note of December 27th, had, by the acknowledgment of the Executive Council, no other credentials than thoſe which he had received from the King of France, and Mr. Burgoign, by the acknowledgement of the ſame Council, was in the ſame ſituation at Madrid as Mr. Chauvelin was at London, the circumſtance, that the Miniſter of the King of Spain ſtill continued to give him the title of Miniſtre Plenipotentiaire de France, by no means proves what the Executive Council intended to prove by it. For, ſince Mr. Burgoign had received no letters of credence from the Executive Council, the title, which the Spaniſh Miniſtry ſtill gave him, was neceſſarily founded on the letters of credence, which he had brought from Louis XVI. The Britiſh Miniſtry likewiſe refuſed not to grant Mr. Chauvelin a title derived from *this* ſource, as appears from the firſt paragraph in Lord Grenville's note of the 31ſt of December. They declared only, what was perfectly true, that, when he came forward as an agent of the French Executive Council, he could not act under a title, and under an authority, which he had not derived from that Council. This declaration was ſurely very different